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NOMOS 
 
MARTIN LOUGHLIN 
 
 
 
 
On what will man base the economy of the world he wants to rule? If left to each 
individual’s whim, what confusion! If on justice, he knows not what it is. Certainly, if he 
did know, he would not have laid down that most common of all men’s maxims, that a 
man must follow the customs of his own country. The glory of true equity would have 
held all nations in its sway. We should see it enacted by all the States of the world, in every 
age, instead of which we see nothing, just or unjust, which does not change in quality with 
a change in climate. Three degrees of latitude overthrow jurisprudence. A meridian 
determines the truth. Law has its periods…  
From this confusion derives the fact that one man will say the essence of justice is 
the legislator’s authority, another the king’s convenience, and a third, present custom. This 
last is the safest. Following reason alone, nothing is intrinsically just; everything moves 
with the times. Custom is the whole of equity for the sole reason that it is accepted. That is 
the mystical basis of its authority. Whoever tries to trace this authority back to its origins, 
destroys it. … The art of criticizing and overthrowing States lies in unsettling established 
customs by delving to their core in order to demonstrate their lack of authority and justice. 
They say they have to go back to the fundamental and original laws of the State, which 
unjust custom has abolished. This is a sure way of losing everything; nothing will be just 
on those scales. … This is why the wisest of legislators used to say that the good of 
mankind requires them to be deceived … He must not be allowed to be aware of the truth 
about the usurpation. It was introduced once without reason and has since become 
reasonable. He must be made to regard it as genuine and eternal, and its origins must be 
disguised if it is not to come to a swift end. 
Blaise Pascal, Pensées, [1670] § 94. 
 
 
ORIGINS 
 
 
Every jurist seeking to explain the constitution of political authority sooner or later 
encounters the problem of origins. In order to avoid an infinite regress, theorists invariably 
try to convert the historical into a normative inquiry, often with unsatisfactory consequences. 
Expressing his frustration over abstract appeals to ‘justice’, Pascal places his faith – as have 
others before and since – in custom. But he recognizes that, if subjected to close analysis, 
 2 
this answer will not satisfy many: custom, it will be suggested, merely bolsters established 
authority and legitimates a regime that founds itself on an original act of usurpation. 
Accepting the force of that point, Pascal acknowledges that there is a mystical basis to 
authority which is unable to withstand intense scrutiny. If measured according to the power 
of one’s ‘sovereign reason’ every claim to authority will be suspect: puncture the mystical and 
authority is destroyed. Pascal’s warning is directed primarily to the future: modernity, on the 
threshold of which he stood, is a condition characterized by unwillingness to accept the 
authority of appeals to the ‘eternal past’. Its defining feature is the need to discover a rational 
basis of political authority.  
Many political theorists – Thomas Hobbes and John Locke being prominent 
examples - have tried to resolve these difficulties by deploying the idiom of a social contract.  
This converts the question of origins into an exercise of imagination. The challenge becomes 
that of showing how reason dictates that humans should abandon such freedom as they 
possess within their ‘natural state’ and, for the purpose of securing and sustaining freedom, 
subject themselves to an order of government. There are evident difficulties even before we 
leave the seminar room. How is it possible for a multitude of strangers able to meet, 
deliberate and rationally agree a constitution for the common good? Rousseau explicitly 
recognized the paradoxical character of the exercise. For this to happen ‘the effect would 
have to become the cause’, in that humans would have to be beforehand that which they can 
only become as a consequence of the foundational pact. How can this entity called ‘the 
people’ deliberate and establish a political union if they are identifiable as such only by virtue 
of the pact?1 
Faced with such difficulties, constitutional lawyers have tended to retreat to the field 
of positive law. Law, they maintain, is created by the establishment of a constitution and 
how and by whom that constitution is authorized are questions lying beyond the boundaries 
of legal knowledge. By this manoeuvre, legal science is founded only once the authority of a 
                                                 
1 J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract in his The Social Contract and other later political writings V. Gourevitch trans. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 71. Political theorists have enjoyed playing with this paradox 
ever since: see, eg, L. Althusser, ‘Rousseau: The Social Contract (the Discrepancies)’ in Althusser, Politics and 
History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx B. Brewster trans. (London: Verso, 2007), 113-160; J. Derrida, ‘Declarations 
of Independence’ (1986) 15 New Political Science 7-15; B. Honig, ‘Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of 
Founding a Republic’ (1991) 85 American Political Science Review 97–114.  
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constitution is pre-supposed. That view, most coherently expressed by Hans Kelsen,2 has 
become generally accepted. Constitutional lawyers maintain the purity of their discipline only 
by accepting that law is a system of norms authorized by a founding norm, the authority of 
which must simply be assumed. On this account, an autonomous legal order exists only 
when it is not only ‘purified of all political ideology’, but also of all empirical knowledge, that 
is of ‘every element of the natural sciences’.3  
In their distinctive ways, political and legal theorists have sought to retreat to the 
normative plane in order to avoid having to engage with the actual political circumstances 
through which constitutional authority is established and maintained. For the discipline of 
political jurisprudence, however, this is unsatisfactory. While acknowledging the power of 
normative constructions, political jurisprudence founds itself on the assumption that, if 
existing political conditions are ignored, a distorted view is formed not only of the nature of 
political authority but also of the concept of law.4 
The moment we move out of the seminar room an altogether different narrative 
presents itself. Rousseau again offers insight. In his Discourse on Inequality he addresses the 
origins of modern government as a matter of historical fact in order to show that the types 
of constitution jurists treat as presuppositions of legal knowledge are invariably deceptive 
and fraudulent devices. They are documents drafted by the wealthy who have ‘invented 
specious arguments’ to win over the people to the established order of things. They exist to 
transform ‘a skilful usurpation into an irrevocable right’.5 The tricks that political theorists 
perform, and the lines that constitutional lawyers draw, function to uphold and legitimate an 
order of exploitation.  
Rousseau’s insights are radicalized by writers such as Georges Sorel and Walter 
Benjamin whose general aim is to reveal the violent underpinnings of law that liberal political 
thought and normativist legal thought shields from view. Sorel and Benjamin claim not only 
                                                 
2 H. Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory B.L. Paulson and S.L. Paulson trans. of first edn. [1934] of 
Reine Rechtslehre (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 57: ‘What is to be valid as norm is whatever the framers of the 
first constitution have expressed as their will.  … this is the basic presupposition of all cognition of the legal 
system resting on this constitution’.  
3 Ibid. 1. 
4 For an account of this idea of public law as political jurisprudence, see M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
5 J.J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men [1755] in his The Discourses and other 
early political writing V. Gourevitch ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 111-222, at 173. 
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that law finds its origins in violence; it also achieves reaffirmation in acts of violence.6 All 
violence, Benjamin asserts, ‘is either law-making or law-preserving’.7 Although Hobbes 
conceived life in the state of nature as a perpetual ‘war of all against all’, he used this image 
to convince us of the rational need to cede our natural rights and vest authority in the 
sovereign. In Benjamin’s critique, Hobbes’s ingenious device of the social contract not only 
transforms chaos and violence into order: the office of the sovereign instituted as a 
consequence of the contract also legitimates the continuation of violence.  
Benjamin presents a radical critique of liberal political thought. His challenge cannot 
be altogether avoided by those who seek to maintain the purity of legal ordering by severing 
the connection between legitimacy and legality. In ridiculing the tradition of natural law on 
the ground that it is perennially focused on ‘the eternal question of what stands behind the 
positive law’, for example, Kelsen maintains that those who continue to seek an answer ‘will 
find, I fear, neither an absolute metaphysical truth nor the absolute justice of natural law’.  
Rather, whoever ‘lifts the veil and does not shut his eyes will find staring at him the Gorgon 
head of power’.8 This might count as a criticism of the attempt by natural lawyers to fix a 
connection between law and justice. But Kelsen appears not to recognize that his argument 
also highlights the problem of presupposing the autonomy – and authority – of an extant 
legal order since, for many, legal order suggests not merely efficacy but legitimacy.  
Pascal tells us that wise lawgivers used to say that ‘the good of mankind requires 
them to be deceived’, that these violent origins be masked. But the contemporary situation is 
different: today, it seems, the ‘wise’ scholars – the normative political and legal theorists – 
have come to believe their own myths and, rather than participating in statecraft, are in the 
business of deceiving themselves. If a sense of reality is to be restored, the discipline of 
political jurisprudence must be rejuvenated, not least because it tries to ensure that the 
normative and the factual, the imaginary and the real, reason and history are drawn into an 
appropriate relationship. It accepts that unless the question of the origins of political order, 
                                                 
6 G. Sorel, Reflections on Violence [1915] J. Jennings ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); W. 
Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’ in W. Benjamin, Selected Writings M. Bullock and M. W. Jennings trans. 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), 236–252. 
7 Benjamin, ibid. 243. For analysis see: J-W Müller, ‘Myth, law and order: Schmitt and Benjamin read Reflections 
on Violence’ (2003) 29 History of European Ideas 459–473; S. Weber, ‘Taking Exception to Decision: Walter 
Benjamin and Carl Schmitt’ (1992) 22 no3/4 Diacritics 5-18. 
8 Kelsen (1927), cited in D. Dyzenhaus, ‘Constitutionalism in an old key: legality and constituent power’ (2012) 
1 Global Constitutionalism 229-260, at 229. 
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including its origins in violence or domination, is addressed, a skewed, if not thoroughly 
ideological, conception of law is likely to result.  
In approaching the question of origins from the perspective of political 
jurisprudence, I examine the topic through a study of one of its most controversial 
practitioners. Carl Schmitt argues that the basic error of modern legal thought flows from 
the fact that jurists have systematically ignored the question of origins. This he attributes to 
the dominant influence of normativism and positivism, the effect of which has been to 
presuppose and bracket the violence of an original act of acquisition. Schmitt therefore 
returns to the question of origins for the purpose of restoring a more adequate 
understanding of the constitution of political authority and setting in place a more realistic 
concept of law. The core concept in his analysis is that of nomos. This Chapter examines and 
evaluates Schmitt’s treatment of this concept. 
 
THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF NOMOS 
 
Schmitt investigates the meaning of nomos through an exposition in five introductory 
corollaries and three concluding corollaries to his major work, The Nomos of the Earth in the 
International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (NE).9 His primary objective is to restore its 
original meaning. The crux of his argument is that the word has undergone many shifts in 
meaning over the last 3,000 years and its original meaning has since been overlooked.  
Although his explanation involves a significant amount of historical and philological analysis, 
Schmitt’s purpose is juristic. The objective is to specify its original legal-constitutional 
meaning ‘in its energy and majesty’ (NE 67) in order to demonstrate how jurists who 
translate nomos simply as law or, if they are to differentiate it from written law, as custom, do 
not get to the root of the matter.  
 The Greek noun nomos, Schmitt explains, derives from the Greek verb nemein and, in 
common acceptance, nemein has three main meanings: these are (in German) nehmen (to 
appropriate), teilen (to divide) and weiden (to pasture). In its first meaning it signifies a taking, 
especially a land-appropriation. This process of land-appropriation forms the basis of the 
history of every settled people and ‘not only logically, but also historically, land-
                                                 
9 C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum [1950] GL Ulmen trans 
(New York, Telos Press Publishing, 2003). 
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appropriation precedes the order that follows from it’. This first meaning of nomos thus 
signifies the constitution of ‘the original spatial order, the source of all further concrete order 
and all further law’. Schmitt contends that ‘all subsequent law and everything promulgated 
and enacted thereafter as decrees and commands are nourished … by this source’ (NE 48).
 Although the first meaning of nomos as an appropriation has long been forgotten in 
jurisprudence, Schmitt notes that the second – the process of division and distribution – has 
not. This original division and distribution is the basis of property. He shows this with 
reference to the passage in Leviathan in which Hobbes explains that ‘the introduction of 
propriety is an effect of commonwealth’; it is the product of the law-making act of the 
sovereign. This, Hobbes notes, ‘they well knew of old, who called that Nomos, that is to say, 
distribution, which we call law; and defined justice, by distributing to every man his own.’10 Nomos 
in this second sense entails an authorized property distribution, the allotted share of goods 
within a commonwealth. Schmitt contends that the earth is connected to law in three ways: 
‘She contains law within herself, as a reward for labour; she manifests law upon herself as 
fixed boundaries; and she sustains law above herself, as a public sign of order’ (NE 42).11  
The third meaning of nomos, pasturage, signifies the type of productive activity that 
normally accompanies ownership. Through this type of activity the division of land becomes 
more apparent. The land is ‘delineated by fences, enclosures, boundaries, walls, houses and 
other constructs’ and eventually ‘the orders and orientations of human social life become 
apparent’ (NE 42).  This third meaning ‘obtains its content from the type and means of the 
production and manufacture of goods’ (NE 327).  
These three meanings of nomos are conceived to form a fixed relation: appropriation 
precedes division, just as division precedes production. Schmitt emphasizes two points. The 
first is that appropriation is the most fundamental stratum of nomos: the constitutive process 
of a land-acquisition ‘is found at the beginning of the history of every settled people, every 
commonwealth, every empire’ (NE 48). No one ‘can give, divide and distribute without 
taking’, and in the beginning, ‘there was no basic norm, but a basic appropriation’ (NE 345). 
The second point is that this most basic stratum of nomos is the one that has been 
                                                 
10 T. Hobbes, Leviathan R. Tuck ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch.24. 
11 With respect to the law as the ‘public sign of order’, Schmitt notes the relation between this second meaning 
of nomos as teilen and the German word for judgment, Urteil, which in a literal sense (Ur-teil) means original 
division (NE 326). 
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consistently repressed in modern thought. The sense of nomos as ‘the first measure of all 
subsequent measures’ and as ‘the first partition and classification of space’ has been eclipsed. 
 
THE SHIFT IN THE MEANING OF NOMOS 
 
Schmitt’s explanation of the original meaning of nomos is corroborated in studies undertaken 
by classical scholars. Many have analysed Pindar’s fragment 169 which speaks of nomos 
basileus, nomos as king.12 Although interpretation is notoriously difficult because of the 
semantic ambiguities of the term, it is commonly accepted that in Pindar’s work nomos is ‘an 
all-pervasive power governing with extreme violence the affairs of both gods and men’ and 
that this is conceived as a ‘very general concept of a sovereign power governing everything, 
including the gods’. Nomos acts as ‘a supreme regulator and an amoral, violent agent’.13 In 
this understanding, nomos expresses a sense that violence or force is an intrinsic aspect of 
constitutive power. What results is not a vindication of ‘might is right’. Rather, it is an 
expression of the tragic dimension to the political: political order is the product of necessity. 
 Classical scholars also explain that the term underwent a shift in meaning during the 
fifth century BC.14 Before then, it was acknowledged that nomos conferred a sense of 
obligation ‘motivated less by the authority of the agent who imposed it than by the fact that 
it is regarded and accepted as valid by those who live under it’.15 Nomos signified order. It 
acquired its more conventional meaning as statute only during the fifth century. The 
significance of this shift has been generally acknowledged, with Martin Ostwald explaining 
that it ‘reflects a deeper change in Athenian thinking about the nature of law and the attitude 
of the Athenians toward their laws’.16  
 One consequence of this shift is that the original meaning of nomos was lost. This was 
aided by a series of distinctions drawn by the Sophists, the most important of which is that 
between nomos and physis. Since physis signified nature, drawing the two into antithesis led to a 
                                                 
12 See, eg, H. Lloyd-Jones, ‘Pindar Fr. 169’ in his Greek Epic, Lyric, and Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 
163-164. For Schmitt’s account see NE 72-6. 
13 P. Kyriakou, ‘The Violence of Nomos in Pindar fr. 169a’ (2002) 48 Materiali e discussioni per l’analisi dei testi 
classici 195-206 at 198-199. 
14 M. Ostwald, Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); P. Cartledge, 
P. Millett and S. Todd eds, Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991); F.M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), esp. 27-34. 
15 Ostwald, ibid. 55. 
16 Ostwald, ibid. 6. 
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sense of opposition between physis (nature) and nomos (convention). This stressed the 
artificial and purely conventional aspect of laws, making nomos indistinguishable from mere 
prescription.17 By counterposing nomos and physis, the original meaning of nomos was 
converted from a fact of life (sein) into a prescribed ought (sollen). As a mere norm, nomos 
could no longer ‘be distinguished from thesmos (law or legislation), psephisma (plebiscite), or 
rhema (command), and from other categories whose content was not the inner measure of 
concrete order and orientation, but only statutes and acts’ (NE 69).  
Schmitt seeks to restore the original meaning of nomos ‘not to breathe artificial new 
life into dead myths or to conjure up empty shadows’ (NE 69) but as part of the exercise of 
following the constitution of political authority to its source. All questions of collective order 
are to be traced back to the three processes of appropriation, distribution, and production. 
The character of every legal, economic and social order is determined by answers to a set of 
basic questions. Where and how was it appropriated? Where and how was it divided? Where 
and how was it produced? (NE 327-8). The Greek concept of nomos in its original meaning, 
as the concrete form of life established in answer to those questions, expresses this most 
basic grasp of the nature of legal ordering. Nomos is an expression of the constituent power 
to establish order through an original act of appropriation and division.  
This philological exercise throws into relief the significance of the constitutive 
moment. Modern jurisprudence too readily works within the frame of an unquestioned 
established order that frames legal thought and conceptual practice. In a situation in which 
‘there is no longer any horizon other than the status quo’, normativism and positivism 
‘become the most plausible and self-evident matters in the world’ (NE 341). Further, once 
nomos becomes the antithesis of physis and ‘ought’ is separated from ‘is’, ‘one could play 
endlessly on the antithesis of right and power’ (NE 342). It is, for example, only once the 
shift in the meaning of nomos to that of ‘mere enactment’ has been accepted that Pindar’s text 
can be interpreted as meaning ‘nothing more than the arbitrary right of the stronger’ (NE 
73). By virtue of this shift, we lose sense of nomos as the constitutive act of spatial ordering, 
as ‘the full immediacy of a legal power not mediated by laws’ and as ‘an act of legitimacy, 
                                                 
17 H. Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), 186. 
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whereby the legality of a mere law first is made meaningful’ (NE 73). As a consequence, we 
lose sense of the true meaning of ‘the normative power of the factual’.18  
Restoring the original meaning of nomos thus serves the contemporary purpose of 
placing in question the authority of the predominant positivism and normativism of modern 
legal thought. Schmitt argues that today the term ‘legality’ has come to mean only ‘the 
functional mode of a state bureaucracy’, with the unfortunate consequence that ‘terms, 
concepts, and conceptual antitheses of our contemporary, completely deteriorated situation 
are projected into discussions of the genuine and original word nomos’ (NE 71). This process 
was aided by the manner in which the Sophists also made a connection between nomos and 
logos. Logos, meaning something that lacked passion and which therefore stood for reason, 
‘was placed above the instinctual and emotional character of the human individual’ (NE 
342). Schmitt identifies this move as the source of confusion over the contemporary idea of 
‘the rule of law’. This is because, recognizing that nomos is without passion, Aristotle 
contended that ‘not men, but laws should rule’.19 This, Schmitt argues, transforms the 
meaning of Pindar’s nomos basileus, though the ‘intellectual trick’ can be identified only if the 
linguistic shift in the meaning of nomos has been grasped (NE 342).  
 
THE FIRST NOMOS OF THE EARTH 
 
In ancient mythology, the earth was known as the mother of law. The earth contained within 
herself an inner measure, her fertility, and as land was cleared and cultivated by human 
effort, precise divisions were created and subsequently delineated by boundaries and 
enclosures. The earth sustained law ‘as a public sign of order’ (NE 42). In its original 
meaning, nomos is recognized as the measure by which the land in a specific location is 
appropriated and divided and thereby determines the form of political, social, and religious 
ordering. Measure, order, and form coalesce to ‘constitute a spatially concrete unity’ (NE 
70). Nomos is the unity of Ordnung und Ortung, of order and location, or, more euphoniously, 
of order and orientation. 
                                                 
18 NE 342. On ‘the normative power of the factual’ (die normative Kraft des Faktischen), cf. G. Jellinek, Allgemeine 
Staatslehre (Berlin: Springer, 3rd edn. 1922), 337-44. 
19 Aristotle, The Politics [c.335-323 BC] T.A. Sinclair trans., T.J. Saunders ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), 
226. Schmitt believes that Aristotle did in fact maintain elements of the original meaning of nomos, but explains 
that it ‘is necessary to read these passages in Aristotle’s Politics very carefully, in order to recognize the difference 
with respect to modern ideologies of the “rule of law”.’ (NE 68). 
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 In this way, law was bound to land. The nomos by which ‘a people becomes settled, 
i.e., by which it becomes historically situated and turns a part of the earth’s surface into the 
force-field of a particular order, becomes visible in the appropriation of land and in the 
founding of a city or colony’ (NE 70). Law is founded on land-appropriation: this 
appropriation is the ‘primary legal title that underlies all subsequent law’ (NE 46). Although 
the specific histories of law-formation and settlement are varied, with a rich diversity of 
property law arrangements emerging in particular regimes, the original law of property 
derives from a ‘common primeval act’. Every land-appropriation ‘creates a kind of supreme 
ownership of the community as a whole, even if the subsequent distribution of property 
does not remain purely communal’ (NE 45). 
 This primeval act of land-appropriation is the basis of all law. It is the ‘terrestrial 
fundament’ in which ‘all law is rooted’ (NE 47). Land-appropriation precedes the distinction 
between private and public law, it precedes the distinction between dominium and imperium, 
and it in fact establishes the conditions in which such distinctions can evolve (NE 46). That 
land-appropriation precedes the establishment of political order, both historically and 
logically, has been recognized by many great legal philosophers. Schmitt cites, by way of 
illustration, Vico’s account of the first division and demarcation of the land,20 Locke’s 
recognition of the significance of ‘radical title’ which establishes political authority through 
jurisdiction over the land,21 and Kant’s acknowledgement of the fact that ‘supreme 
proprietorship of the soil’ forms the basis of ‘territorial sovereignty’22 (NE46-8). 
 Since nomos is a measure that constitutes a concrete spatial unity, it establishes a 
boundary which divides internal and external. Originally determined by mythical notions, 
‘such as the ocean, the Midgard Serpent, or the Pillars of Hercules’, the security of these 
regimes was maintained by ‘exclusionary defensive structures, such as border fortifications’ 
whose purpose ‘was to separate a pacified order from a quarrelsome disorder, a cosmos 
from a chaos, a house from a non-house, an enclosure from a wilderness’ (NE 52). From 
this division between inside and outside a people is formed. That is, a people is created not 
by blood ties, but by virtue of being situated in a concrete order or nomos. This people, 
attached to a common territory and bound by commitment to a common way of life, 
                                                 
20 Vico, The First New Science [1725] L. Pompa trans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. XXVI. 
21 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government  P.Laslett ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), II. § 121. 
22 I. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice [(Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals; known as the Rechtslehre), J. Ladd 
trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), Pt II: Public Right, Note B (land rights) 
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constitute an ‘intensity of association’ able to form a group organized on a friend/enemy 
antithesis.23 Every powerful people considered ‘their dominion to be the domicile of 
freedom, beyond which war, barbarism, and chaos ruled’ (NE 352). The boundary division 
between internal and external became the boundary division of peace and war, establishing 
the essential conditions for state formation.24 
 Nomos is an ordo ordinans, an order of ordering, that performs the constitutive act of 
establishing a spatially-determined regime of rule. Schmitt notes that the Greek term archy 
means ‘from the source’ and, as monarchy, signals monotheistic power emanating from 
God. Similarly, cracy means ‘power through superior force and occupation’, as in aristocracy 
and democracy.  Nomos, he explains, penetrates both archy and cracy, and neither can exist 
without nomos (NE 337-8). The critical point is that nomos, ‘even if it were to be raised to the 
level of a personalized ruler, is something impersonal’ (NE 338). Monarchies, aristocracies 
and democracies all aim to rule ‘in the name of the law’. When Schmitt argues that law ‘is 
certainly power and appropriation, but as pure law it is only pure appropriation’(NE 349), he 
reveals nomos as the fundamental ‘law of the political’.25 
 Although land-appropriation is the primal act of law creation, there was in a strict 
sense no ‘nomos of the earth’ before the great Age of Discovery, ‘when the earth first was 
encompassed and measured by the global consciousness of European peoples’ (NE 49). 
Consequently, no global sense of the planet existed before the fifteenth century. The first 
phase of nomos was entirely land-bound, it placed Europe at the centre of the earth, and its 
reach was limited to the boundaries of European empires.26 This first phase of nomos was 
eroded only when the oceans were made accessible for exploration and the earth was, for the 
first time, circumnavigated.  
 
                                                 
23 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political [1932] G. Schwab trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 
38. 
24 In the second concluding corollary, ‘Nomos – Nahme – Name’, Schmitt also explains how nomos is not only the 
source of the German word, nehmen (to take) but also nahmen (to name). There is, he argues, a close relation 
between taking and naming: ‘A land-appropriation is constituted only if the appropriator is able to give the land 
a name’ (NE 336-50 at 348). 
25 I develop this point further in M. Loughlin, ‘Politonomy’ in J. Meierhenreich and O. Simons (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of Carl Schmitt (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2014) ch.21 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199916931.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199916931-e-004?rskey=S6qDb8&result=3 
26 In Land und Meer: eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung (Leipzig: Reclam, 1942), Schmitt argues that although pre-
modern regimes, such as Athens, Rome and Venice, did develop a sea-faring culture they remained 
fundamentally tied to the land, with the ‘inland sea’ of the Mediterranean remaining a boundary line (at 23-25). 
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THE SECOND PHASE OF NOMOS 
 
The second phase of nomos, the first global nomos, arose because of discoveries made of land 
and sea by European peoples. This opened up a new spatial order of the earth as the 
European powers competed for land-appropriations in these newly-discovered territories.  
Through exploration and contest, the European peoples ‘appropriated, divided and utilized 
the planet’ (NE 352).  
In the newly-discovered continent of America, this appropriation was achieved by 
the establishment of colonies in what was characterized as ‘free space’, ‘an area open to 
European occupation and expansion’ (NE 87). Lands in Asia could not be appropriated in 
similar manner and in this sphere of the globe ‘the Eurocentric structure of nomos extended 
only partially, as open land-appropriation, and otherwise in the form of protectorates, leases, 
trade agreements, and spheres of interest; in short, in more elastic forms of utilization’ (NE 
352). And it was only during the 19th century that the European powers were able to 
undertake the task of dividing up the continent of Africa. The essential point, however, is 
that this second phase of nomos was global in reach but entirely Eurocentric in structure.  
This phase of nomos, lasting for a period of about 400 years, resulted in a new set of 
appropriations, distributions, and divisions. The ongoing struggle between the European 
powers was stabilized as a result of the emergence of a dual set of balances: between land 
and sea, on the one hand, and between the land powers on the European continent, on the 
other. The first involved a balance between land and sea because there was no balance of sea 
powers: the British alone came to dominate the seas. And the balance of the European land 
powers, Schmitt maintains, was also underpinned by British sea power.  
The emergence of these power-balances during this second phase of nomos was of 
considerable legal significance. This is because, within this second phase, a new European 
spatial order founded on the institution of the state was created. The state, understood as a 
territorially-enclosed organized political entity, was established as a consequence of these 
power-balances. As Schmitt emphasizes, ‘statehood’ is not a universal category, ‘valid for all 
times and all peoples’. It is ‘a concrete historical fact’ and the ‘singular historical particularity 
of this phenomenon called “state” lies in the fact that this political entity was the vehicle of 
secularization’ (NE 127). It became the institution that could neutralize religious conflicts 
and end ‘the European civil war of churches and religious parties’ (NE 128). Recognition of 
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the territorial order of the state – ‘spatially self-contained, impermeable, unburdened with 
the problem of estate, ecclesiastical and creedal civil wars’ – was an achievement of the 
second phase of nomos (NE 129).  
The formation of the state became the foundation on which an elaborate set of 
concepts and practices of modern public law could evolve. Although an entirely European 
creation, these public law concepts assumed a global significance in the modern era through 
colonization or other forms of imperialism and hegemonic influence. The pivotal concept of 
public law is that of sovereignty, which signifies in jural form the essential nature and quality 
of political relationships that emerge within this second phase of nomos. Sovereignty has both 
external and internal dimensions. One set of relations concerns the position of the state in 
the international arena. A regime is recognized as a sovereign state when its governing 
authority is in no way legally dependent on any higher authority, whether that of pope or 
emperor. Correlating with this external aspect is the internal dimension. From the internal 
perspective, sovereignty expresses the conviction that the state is the ultimate source of law. 
There can be no fetter on the law-making authority of the state, whether deriving from 
divine law or natural law. The law made by the authorized institutions of the state – the 
positive law - is supreme.  Sovereignty expresses the state’s independent status as a political 
entity in the world and its absolute authority to make law. 
The sovereign state is an autonomous entity that acknowledges other similar entities 
in the sphere of international relations on the basis of formal equality. During this second 
phase of nomos, this status of sovereignty, which was confined mainly to the European 
powers, created the circumstances for the establishment of public international law. 
Established within the frame of the jus publicum Europaeum, these rules reflected the nature of 
these balances, not least in drawing a distinction between land and sea with respect to 
concepts of war, enemy and booty.27  
Schmitt explains that in international law land war ‘was not conducted between 
peoples, but only between the armies of European states’ and the ‘private property of civil 
populations was not booty according to international law’. Sea war, by contrast, was 
essentially war over commerce and in sea war, ‘the enemy was any state with which the 
                                                 
27 See Schmitt, Land und Meer, above n.26, esp. 42-46, where he explains that the sea could never be bounded in 
the same way as land and, as a consequence, the distinction between trade, conflict, and piracy could not be 
clearly drawn. 
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opponent had commercial dealings’. Consequently, the ‘private property of civil populations 
of warring states, and even of neutrals with whom they had trade relations was fair booty, 
according to blockade and prize law’ (NE 353).  
The event that shapes the form of this new body of law is that of discovery and 
colonial expansion: ‘when an old world sees a new one arise beside it, it is challenged 
dialectically and is no longer old in the same sense’ (NE 87). The opening up of new worlds 
provided the exceptional conditions that helped to normalize the rules of interaction in the 
old. This operated across two dimensions. First, a distinction arose between ordered land 
and free sea, illustrated by the fact that although the Stuart kings were bound by the lex terrae 
in their domestic affairs, their prerogative powers were considered absolute on the seas.28 
Colonial expansion thus provided opportunities for sovereigns to exercise their prerogative 
powers ‘beyond the seas’ untrammeled by the ‘law of the land’.29 Secondly, the significance 
of the establishment of ‘amity lines’ became of vital importance in formalizing rules of 
international law. These amity lines, marked by treaties between European powers, sought 
mainly to delineate spheres of jurisdiction. By marking the lines at which ‘Europe’ ended and 
the ‘new world’ began, they also established the boundary between norm and exception.30 In 
doing so, they helped to embed the rules of public international law within the ‘normal’ 
boundaries of European engagement, leading to a bracketing and formalization of war. But 
beyond these lines the conventions of European public law had no meaning: ‘the struggle for 
                                                 
28 It might be noted that the boundary line between prerogative (abroad) and law (at home) is the central 
constitutional question in the case of Ship Money: R v Hampden (1637) 3 St.Tr. 825. More generally note the 
debate between Grotius and Selden on the question of free or closed seas and the issues of state policy that 
underpinned it: see H. Grotius, Mare Liberum (1609); J. Selden, Mare Clausum (1619) and discussed extensively in 
R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 59-
63, 86-91; id., Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 170-9, 212-
7; id. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 90-4, 114-20. Tuck explains that Grotius’ work ‘had in fact been prepared … at the 
express request of the East Indies Company, who wished to influence the peace negotiations then in progress’ 
(Philosophy at 170) and that the first draft of Selden’s work was never published until1635 when it was 
‘completely rewritten at the request of Charles’s government, as part of its anti-Dutch propaganda’ (Philosophy at 
212) and in the context of a fishing dispute between England and Holland and which ‘led, incidentally, to Ship 
Money; the fleet for which the tax was intended was designed to protect English fishing’ (Natural Rights, at 86).  
29 This general point is more complicated in British practice since the legal position with respect to colonies 
depended on whether they had been settled or conquered. If the former, British subjects carried their common 
law rights with them whereas colonies by conquest or cession fell under the Crown’s prerogative power without 
limitation: see, Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co.Rep. 1a, at 17b; Campbell v Hall Lofft 655, 741; Forbes v Cochrane (1824) 2 
B.& C. 448; Campbell v Kyte (1835) 3 Knapp 332. 
30 See, eg, A. Pagden, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c.1500-1800 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); D. Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. ch.4. 
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land-appropriations knew no bounds’, there were no legal limits to the conduct of war, and 
‘only the law of the stronger applied’ (NE 93-4). 
This second phase of the nomos of the earth – the first on a global basis - established 
a Eurocentric order that left it marked in measurement (think only of the Greenwich 
meridian), in naming (think only of America, Louisiana, New Amsterdam/New York), but 
most of all by the distinction between the juridical processes of ‘constitutionalization’ of the 
state and formalization of international law within the ‘norm’ of the European spatial order 
and colonization through settlement or subjugation (or both) in the ‘exceptional’ spheres 
beyond. When Hobbes in the mid-17th century used the device of the state of nature 
characterized as a ‘war of all against all’ to resolve the problem of the foundation he had in 
mind not only the threat of European religious wars but also the race for land-appropriation 
‘beyond the pale’ in the new world. That is, the image of the state of nature could be 
deployed not only as a temporal heuristic to address the issue of foundational origins, but 
also as a spatial heuristic to differentiate a sphere of civilization from that of chaos. When in 
the late-17th century Locke evokes a more benign image of life in a state of nature to justify 
the establishment of a liberal constitutional regime, he nevertheless has this distinction 
between norm and exception in mind. ‘In the beginning’, he reminds us, ‘all the world was 
America’.31 And when in 1670 Pascal wrote that ‘three degrees of latitude overthrow 
jurisprudence’, ‘a meridian determines the truth’, and ‘law has its periods’, he was not dealing 
with the banalities of differences in the laws of different states. Pascal’s meridian, Schmitt 
suggests, ‘is actually nothing but the amity lines of his time, which had created an abyss 
between freedom (the lawlessness of the state of nature) and an orderly “civil” mode of 
existence’ (NE 95).32 
 
LAW AS INSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
                                                 
31 Locke, above n.21, § 49: ‘Thus in the beginning all the World was America, and more so than that is now’. 
See NE 96-7. 
32 Schmitt notes that Grotius and Pufendorf were similarly influenced. He argues that although some European 
powers concluded treaties with native leaders ‘no European power considered itself to be the legal successor to 
the natives’. In asserting their position, he explains, they are not relying on classical sources but on the 
distinction Grotius makes between original and derivative acquisition: De jure belli ac pacis (1625), Bk II, ch 2 
(NE 136). And Pufendorf recognizes ‘a type of original property acquisition that takes the form of a “common 
seizure by a majority of persons”’, which involves the creation of ‘general property’ and thus to be 
distinguished from ‘the origin of specific private property’. See S. Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium (1672), Bk 
4, ch 6 (Acquisition by virtue of the right of the initial occupant). This, Schmitt concludes, is ‘very close to 
actual land-appropriation’ (NE 137).  
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This Eurocentric nomos of the earth drew to a close as a consequence of the First World 
War.33 Schmitt’s argument on this point is complicated, but in outline it concerns: the 
relativization of Europe as a consequence of the growth of American power and the 
influence of other non-European states; the decline of jus publicum Europaeum and the 
conversion of international law into a set of universal norms lacking substance; the 
consequent growth of a ‘normative industry’ leading to the ‘nihilistic inflation of numberless, 
contradictory pacts emptied of any content by stated or unstated provisos’ (NE 239) and 
generating ‘an illusory science of international law’ (NE 243); and, given the inability to 
establish a global balance, the emergence of an east-west ‘cold war’ driven by a dialectic of 
isolation and intervention. 
These developments have resulted in the displacement of the European-centred 
order established on a land-based balance of power: in place of European powers 
determining the spatial order of the world, during the 20th century the world determined the 
spatial order of Europe. The balance between sea and land was also undermined, not only by 
the loss of British domination of the seas, but also as a result of the emergence of 
technologies that have ‘robbed the sea of its elemental character’ (NE 354) and have created 
a third dimension – airspace – which has established itself as a new battleground and 
transformed understanding of the nomos of the earth. Schmitt contends that every new age 
comes into existence as a result of new spatial divisions, resulting in the formation of new 
spatial orders of the earth. Writing in the 1950s, he believed that either one the superpowers 
would defeat the other and this would be the staging for the ultimate unification of the earth 
or, more likely, that a new equilibrium would emerge constituted by the existence of several 
relatively independent Großräume. 
My objective here is not to speculate about these developments, but to try and 
understand the general significance of Schmitt’s argument about law as nomos. His most basic 
point with respect to the issue of origins is that order, in the beginning, was not established 
on the basis of consent or on some universal principle or a basic norm. In the beginning, 
there was a land-grab and only after the violence of that initial appropriation and division 
                                                 
33 For a general appraisal see M. Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International law: Dealing with Eurocentrism’ 
(2011) 19 Rechtsgeschichte 152-176, at 158: ‘Until late-19th century, histories of international law were 
unthinkingly Eurocentric. Europe served as the origin, engine and telos of historical knowledge. In the 20th 
century, it became more difficult to articulate the normative goal of international law.’ 
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had been completed, ‘when the problems of founding anew and of transition have been 
surpassed’, could ‘some degree of calculability and security’ be achieved and nomos emerge as 
the expression of order (NE 341). Like Pascal’s concept of custom, law evolves; it is not 
fully formed at the foundation, though it remains ‘nourished’ by this source. 
Nomos founds a concrete spatial entity, but the basis of order continues to evolve in 
response to answers offered to ‘the fundamental question of the problematic sequence of 
appropriation, distribution, and production’ (NE 333).34 World history ‘is the history of 
development in the object, means, and forms of appropriation interpreted as progress’. It is 
a development proceeding from ‘the land-appropriations of nomadic and agrarian-feudal times 
to the sea-appropriations of the 16th to the 19th century, over the industry-appropriations of the 
industrial-technical age and its distinction between developed and underdeveloped areas, and 
finally, to the air–appropriations and space-appropriations of the present’ (NE 347). The concrete 
form of nomos thus alters according to the development of world history. 
From this account it is evident that nomos carries a rather different connotation to 
that of the norms of positive law. Law as nomos is an expression of the substantive order of a 
political unity created by the processes of appropriation, division and production. Given this 
understanding, nomos can now be related to other key concepts, such as state and 
constitution. For Schmitt, the state is ‘the concrete, collective condition of political unity’;35 
in modernity, it becomes the ‘master ordering concept’ of this political unity.36 It is similarly 
clear that Schmitt’s concept of constitution (in its absolute sense) differs from the notion of 
constitutional law as that enacted in modern documentary form. Since the order that 
emerges within the state arises from ‘a pre-established, unified will’,37 Schmitt argues that the 
state ‘does not have a constitution’; rather, ‘the state is constitution’. In this sense, the 
state/constitution is ‘an actually present condition, a status of unity and order’.38 The basic 
                                                 
34 See NE 330-335, where Schmitt shows the contrasting positions of various liberal and socialist theories. 
Whereas liberalism ‘solves the social question with reference to increases in production and consumption’ 
(331), socialist positions vary: Fourier ‘subsumed all problems of appropriation and distribution under a 
fantastic increase in production’, Proudhon’s socialism is ‘essentially a doctrine of division and distribution’ 
(333) and Marx’s launched an attack ‘on the expropriation of the expropriators (334). 
35 C. Schmitt, Constitutional Theory [1928] trans. J. Seitzer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 65. 
36 C. Schmitt, ‘Staat als ein konkreter, an eine geschichtliche Epoche gebundener Begriff’ [1941] in C. Schmitt, 
Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924-1954 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958), 375-85, at 375: ‘In 
diesem Zeitalter … ist der Staat der alles beherrschende Ordnungsbegriff der politischen Einheit’. 
37 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, above n.35, 65. 
38 Schmitt, ibid. 60. 
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law of the state finds its authoritative expression not in enacted legal norms but in ‘the 
political existence of the state’.39 
Once brought into alignment it would appear that state (the political unity), 
constitution (the status of unity and order) and nomos (the order of a concrete spatial unity) 
are, to all intents and purposes, synonyms. Schmitt recognizes that, like nomos, the state and 
the constitution continue to evolve: the state expresses ‘the principle of the dynamic emergence 
of political unity, of the process of constantly renewed formation and emergence of this unity 
from a fundamental or ultimately effective power and energy’.40 And he recognizes that the 
‘continuity of a constitution is manifest as long as the regress to this primary appropriation is 
recognizable and recognized’ (NE 326, n6). If state highlights unity, and constitution the 
form of that unity, then nomos accentuates the motive forces that shape the form of that 
unity: it is ‘the full immediacy of a legal power not mediated by laws; it is a constitutive 
historical event – an act of legitimacy, whereby the legality of a mere law first is made 
meaningful’ (NE 73). 
In earlier studies, such as Political Theology and Constitutional Theory, Schmitt had 
emphasized the decisionist elements of order-maintenance: the sovereign is thus identified as 
the institution that ‘decides’ when the norm is displaced in the exceptional moment,41 and 
constituent power ‘is the political will, whose power or authority is capable of making the 
concrete, comprehensive decision over the type and form of its own political existence’.42 By 
the late-1920s, however, Schmitt started to shift the emphasis of his argument. In place of 
decision, he accentuated the institutional aspect of unity and order. This is evident in the 
Preface to the second edition of Political Theology in 1933, in which he writes that: ‘I now 
distinguish not two but three types of legal thinking; in addition to the normativist and the 
decisionist types there is the institutional one’.43 ‘Whereas the pure normativist thinks in 
terms of impersonal rules, and the decisionist implements the good law of the correctly 
recognized political situation by means of a personal decision, institutional legal thinking 
                                                 
39 Schmitt, ibid. 65. 
40 Schmitt, ibid. 61. 
41 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, [1922] trans. G. Schwab (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 5. 
42 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, above n.35, 125. 
43 Schmitt, Political Theology, above n.41, 2. 
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unfolds in institutions and organizations that transcend the personal sphere’.44 Institutional 
thinking seeks to capture ‘the stable content’ inherent in the political unity. 
This institutional argument is most clearly presented in his 1934 book, On the Three 
Types of Juristic Thought.45 In this work, Schmitt explained that all legal theories comprise three 
basic elements: norm, decision and concrete order formation. Legal theories may be 
distinguished according to the emphasis they place on each of these elements and the type of 
political regime they envisage is invariably linked to the predominance given to one or other 
of these elements: ‘Every form of political life stands in direct, mutual relationship with the 
specific mode of thought and argumentation of legal life’.46 In this work, Schmitt again 
criticizes normativism, but he also argues against decisionism and in favour of a type of 
institutionalism that he calls ‘concrete-order’ thinking.47  
For institutionalism, order is not primarily the product of a set of rules. Norms or 
rules do not create order; they perform a regulatory function only on the basis of an already-
established order. Normativism remains an appealing type, especially in comparison to the 
personal character of decisionism, primarily because is it ‘can appeal to being impersonal and 
objective’.48 Schmitt argues that in various formulations that emanate from Pindar’s Nomos 
basileus, including Rex, Lex and the idea of a Rechtsstaat, normativists promote the ‘rule of law’ 
over the ‘rule of men’. But he explains that nomos ‘does not mean statute, rule, or norm, but 
rather Recht, which is norm, as well as decision and, above all, order’.49 The ‘rule of law’ 
cannot mean simply ‘the rule of rules’; it must ‘contain certain of the highest, unalterable, but 
concrete ordering qualities’.50 He emphasizes that one ‘can speak of a true Nomos as true king 
                                                 
44 Schmitt, ibid. 3. 
45 C. Schmitt, On the Three Types of Juristic Thought [1934] trans. J. Bendersky (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004). In his 
introduction, Bendersky, explains the shift in the following terms: ‘It was one thing to advocate sovereign 
decisionism within the Weimar constitutional framework or even to entrust Paul von Hindenburg, a political 
figure of proven responsibility deeply devoted to German traditions and western civilization generally, with 
broad exceptional powers in an Ausnahmezustand. It was quite another when such decisions would be made by 
the leader of a dynamic, revolutionary movement unrestrained by the values, traditions, and institutions that 
conservatives such as Schmitt cherished’ (at 14). This may be right, but there would appear to be more basic 
theoretical reasons for this shift and these difficulties were evident even in 1928, when in his Constitutional 
Theory he recognized the importance of homogeneity in democratic order. 
46 Schmitt, ibid. 45. 
47 This could not be termed institutionalism because Schmitt – for evident political reasons in 1934 – sought to 
avoid any association with neo-Thomism exhibited in Hauriou’s work: see Bendersky’s note in Three Types at 
112 (n59). 
48 Schmitt, ibid. 49. 
49 Schmitt, ibid. 50. 
50 Schmitt, ibid. 50 (translation modified). 
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only if Nomos means precisely the concept of Recht encompassing a concrete order and 
Gemeinschaft’.51 
Normativists promote a purely conceptualistic understanding of law, law as a set of 
rules and principles. The arguments of decisionists, by contrast, are reduced ultimately to 
factual analysis. Institutionalism (concrete order thinking) is Schmitt’s attempt to finesse the 
distinction between normativity and facticity.52 Rules and decisions are integral parts of legal 
order, but they carry meaning only as formulations of concrete order. Law as norm does not 
yield sound jurisprudence because a norm ‘cannot apply, administer, or enforce itself’ and 
decisionism is not sustainable because a legal decision does not spring from a normative 
vacuum.53 Legal order is maintained as an expression of the underlying order of nomos. Rules 
and decisions achieve regularity by reliance on ‘concepts of what, in itself, is normal, the 
normal type and the normal situation’.54  
Schmitt’s concrete order thinking has many similarities with the institutionalism 
propounded by the early 20th century French public lawyer, Maurice Hauriou.55 Hauriou, 
whose work Schmitt admired,56 is particularly helpful in this respect since Schmitt does not 
specify in much detail what he means by institution. Hauriou argued that the basis of legal 
order was not social contract, nor the ‘rule of law’, nor legislative authority, nor even directly 
the state. The ‘real basis’ of legal order, he explained, is ‘the institution’.57 Institutions, which 
stand for ‘duration, continuity, and reality’, provide the juridical basis of the state.58  
Hauriou drew a clear distinction between institution and positive law. He 
emphasized that ‘[i]nstitutions make juridical rules; juridical rules do not make institutions’.59 
Institutions are generative and provide stability and continuity, whereas legal rules ‘only 
                                                 
51 Schmitt, ibid. 50-1. 
52 Schmitt, ibid. 53. 
53 Schmitt, ibid. 51, 62. 
54 Schmitt, ibid. 54. 
55 Hauriou developed a juristic concept of ‘directing ideas’ (idées directrices) that, he claimed, performed a 
generative role in the shaping and giving meaning to public institutions. Directing ideas give meaning to the 
basic principles of French public law, which unfold progressively with the power to shape the character of 
governmental institutions. See M. Hauriou, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel (Paris: Sirey, 2nd edn. 1929), esp.73-74. 
56 Schmitt refers to Hauriou as ‘the master of our discipline’ (NE, 210). See also C. Schmitt, Legality and 
Legitimacy [1932] trans J. Seitzer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 57 (referring to Hauriou as ‘an 
outstanding French public law specialist’). 
57 M. Hauriou, ‘An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law’ (1918) 31 Harvard Law Review 813-821, at 
813. 
58 M. Hauriou, ‘The Theory of the Institution and the Foundation: A Study in Social Vitalism’ [1925] in A. 
Broderick (ed), The French Institutionalists (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970), 93-124 at 93. 
59 Hauriou, ibid. Cf Schmitt, Three Types, above n.45, 57: ‘a change in the norm is more the consequence than 
the source of a change in the order’. 
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stand for ideas of limitation instead of incarnating ideas of enterprise and of creation’.60 The 
distinctive function of the institution is to transform ‘an organization of fact into an 
organization of law’ and thereby to transform ‘the real into the right’.61 Hauriou’s concept of 
institution comprises three main elements: the ordering idea (idée directrice); the formation of a 
power able to structure and give effect to the idea; and a widespread acceptance of the 
directing idea in social and political practice.62 Schmitt’s concept of concrete-order is similar 
to Hauriou’s concept of institution. Schmitt also follows Hauriou is taking over his concept 
of superlégalité: super-legality refers to that set of principles and institutions that give form to 
this concrete order.63 Superlegality, resting on shared understandings, has affinities with 
Pascal’s notion of ‘present custom’.64 And it can be grasped as an expression of nomos. 
Schmitt’s institutionalism brings his legal thought much closer to Hegel’s legal and 
political philosophy, in which ‘the state is a “form (Gestalt), which is the complete realization 
of the spirit in being (Dasein)”; an “individual totality”, a Reich of objective reason and 
morality’.65 This type of state, he emphasizes, is not an ‘order of a calculable and enforceable 
legal functionalism’ (ie, the product of decisionism) and nor is it a ‘norm of norms’ 
(normativism). The state ‘is the concrete order of orders, the institution of institutions’.66 
Schmitt notes that ‘the concrete jurisprudential consideration of an orderly state 
administration can best provide the element of a general theory of “institutions”: 
jurisdictional authority, hierarchy of offices, inner autonomy, internal counterbalancing of 
opposing forces and tendencies, inner discipline, honour, and official secrets, and with these 
the all-important fundamental presupposition, namely a normal stabilized situation, a situation 
                                                 
60 Hauriou, ibid. 123. Cf R. Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4 (on jurisgenerative and 
jurispathic tendencies). 
61 Hauriou, ‘Interpretation’, above n.57, 815. He accepts that in the beginning ‘an organization is created simply 
by force’ and then seeks peace. But to obtain peace ‘the new organization must obtain pardon for its origin … 
peaceful existence is possible only when the demands of law are satisfied’ (at 816).  
62 Hauriou, ‘Institution’, above n.58, esp. at 123. 
63 This is analogous to the idea of constituent power: see Hauriou, ibid. at 114; Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, 
57-8. See C. Klein, Théorie et pratique du pouvoir constituant (Paris: PUF, 1996), 159. 
64 Schmitt, Three Types, above n.45, 86: ‘Thus English case law would embody an example of concrete-order 
thinking, which adheres exclusively to the inner Recht of a specific case. The precedent, including its decision, 
then becomes the concrete paradigm for all subsequent cases, which have their Recht concretely in themselves – 
not in a norm or a decision.’ See also C.B. Gray, The Methodology of Maurice Hauriou (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 
91: ‘Practical direction gives custom a great role in law of creating a system of legal expectations, of 
“superlegality”, since the question of such ends is not the question inside of law’. 
65 Schmitt, Three Types, above n.45, 78. 
66 Schmitt, ibid. 78-9. 
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établie’.67 This, it might be noted, is not Hegel’s state in which the universal is willed; it more 
closely approximates his concept of Notstaat, the state based on need, an expression of the 
form within civil society ‘wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is 
interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all’.68    
Schmitt provides a more specific illustration of his institutionalism in Staat, Bewegung, 
Volk (1933), his highly controversial attempt to sketch a constitutional framework for the 
Nazi regime.69 He seeks to show that the entire basis of public law, including those 
provisions taken over from the Weimar Constitution, is now ‘situated in a completely new 
context’.70 Relations between offices of state can no longer be determined ‘through 
formalistic … interpretations of the words of the Weimar Constitution’ since public law 
must ‘promote awareness of the fact that the absolute supremacy of political leadership is 
the effective basic law of today’s state’.71 Political unity is the product of a tripartite synthesis 
of state, movement and people which provides ‘the essential structural and organizational 
policies of the concrete arrangement of the state’.72 This unity is not determined by positive 
law (Legalität), which has become merely ‘the functioning mode of the state administrative 
apparatus’; rather ‘to the law (Recht) in a substantive sense belongs the first guarantee of 
securing political unity’.73 Every state ‘needs a coherent internal logic of its institutions and 
norms’ and ‘a unitary form of thought (formgedanken) that gives constancy of shape (Gestalt) 
to all the spheres of public life’.74 However various the rules and regulations may be, a 
‘consistent main principle must be recognized and maintained’.75 Though he does not use the 
expression, Schmitt here contrasts positive law and nomos. 
 
NOMOS IN CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The concept of nomos features prominently in the work of Friedrich Hayek and Michael 
Oakeshott. Both use nomos in its post-5th century meaning, suggesting an equation between 
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the terms nomos basileus and ‘the rule of law’. For Schmitt, this usage is an ‘intellectual trick’, 
since Hayek and Oakeshott construct their accounts on the distinction between norm and 
decision, with nomos being understood as meaning ‘norm’ rather than ‘concrete order’. 
 The idea of order plays a key role in Hayek’s thought but it is not conceived as an 
independent variable. By drawing a sharp distinction between spontaneous order (organism) 
and constructed order (organization), Hayek effectively absorbs the idea of order into either 
norm or decision.76 Spontaneous order is associated with the emergence of an idea of law as 
evolving rules of just conduct and therefore as a set of norms, and constructed order is tied 
to an image of law as command (legislation) and consequently is treated as the product of 
decision.77 Having identified the distinction between norm and decision as the central 
tension of legal order, Hayek contends that nomos, which he calls ‘the law of liberty’, yields 
the true meaning of law. Nomos is taken to be an expression of universal rules of just 
conduct; in its true meaning, law acts as a restraint on the exercise of power. Law as 
legislation, by contrast, conceives of law as an instrument of power.78 For Hayek, the 
emergence of the latter conception of law – which consists predominantly of public (as 
distinct from private) law79 - has been a retrograde step, is inimical to liberty,80 and must be 
strictly restrained.81 
 Oakeshott comes closer to sharing Schmitt’s view of legal order. Since ‘all 
governments began in violence’, Oakeshott acknowledges that the attempt to locate 
authority in origins will prove fruitless. He is also sceptical of the attempt to convert the 
question of authority into a philosophical problem that can be resolved by contract and 
consent.82 Authority is established not by virtue of a specific historical event but from a much 
more haphazard historical process in which force, in order to preserve its own position, is 
eventually required to yield to customary practice. ‘All were aware of anarchy just below the 
surface’, Oakeshott notes, and few modern governments ‘have won for themselves anything 
but a very precarious authority’.83  He notes that the process by which ‘power’ is obliged to 
work through customary ways might be regarded as one in which power is ‘moralized’. But 
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he suggests that it is better conceived as being analogous to the rights of squatters, that is, as 
involving a process in which ‘rights’ to govern ‘grow out of acquiescence and the absence of 
objection, and they are acquired by prescription, when what was once a demand receives 
recognition as a “rightful” claim’.84  
Oakeshott’s treatment of political order differs considerably from Hayek’s and is 
much closer to Pascal. He recognizes that if, like Hayek, the state is conceived to be 
analogous to an organism, then strictly there is no place for a ruler or for government: ‘It 
would live and move as a vital unit, its vitality being continuously distributed in all its parts’.85 
This, in Oakeshott’s view, falls into the category of ‘implausible and gimcrack beliefs’86 – ‘the 
sort of thing only a philosopher would think of’.87 The ambiguous character of the state can 
be grasped, he suggests, only be considering two images of the state that manage to 
incorporate important directions of thought. These are the state as societas and the state as 
universitas.88 In On Human Conduct, Oakeshott unpacks these ideal characters in detail, but it 
might be noted that in his Lectures these two images are referred to as nomocracy and teleocracy: 
‘government understood as the rule of its subjects by means of law’ and government 
‘imposing on its subjects a substantive condition of things representing a single “purpose” 
pursued by all’.89  
Oakeshott here uses nomocracy and teleocracy as analogies for norm and decision in the 
constitution of legal order. He recognizes that these terms represent ideal modes of 
association and explains that these ideal characters of state, government and law have 
become ‘two well-trodden paths’ that remain irreconcilably opposed to one another.90 He 
accepts that some might reject this interpretation ‘on the ground that it leaves an 
incoherence which, it is thought, should be capable of resolution’. And – in an allusion to 
Hayek among others – he notes that some writers ‘have tried to make it intelligible to 
themselves by recognizing one of these dispositions as dominant and the other as 
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recessive’.91 But this, he suggests, is unconvincing: ‘the most one can do is to offer these 
terms as the most effective apparatus for understanding the actual complexity of a state’.92  
Oakeshott rightly keeps open the tension between normativism and decisionism in 
the act of imagining legal order. But as a consequence of adopting the reformulated 
conception of nomos,93 he is without a method by which to mediate the gulf between the 
characters of societas and universitas, and of legal ordering as norm and decision. The great 
value of Schmitt’s restoration of the original meaning of nomos and its elaboration in the idea 
of concrete order is to offer a concept which is able to bridge that gulf. Schmitt’s tripartite 
scheme does not bring resolution to the issue of the equivocal character of the modern state 
and its mode of legal ordering. But it does follow Oakeshott in recognizing that these 
dispositions are historical self-understandings and not universal types. ‘Each has to be 
recognized as a contingent response to a historic situation’, Oakeshott emphasizes, and this 
suggests that ‘they should not be so starkly opposed to one another: each is a historic 
character and a character on the wing continuously exposed to modification in intercourse 
with the other’.94 Schmitt would not disagree. All that is needed to enrich Oakeshott’s 
account of the character of the state is Schmitt’s understanding of the original meaning of 
nomos as the concrete order that grounds the meaning and variable importance of norm and 
decision in the constitution of its legal order. And this is not so far removed from Pascal’s 
conception of ‘present custom’. 
The one scholar for whom nomos in its original sense performs a major role in the 
construction of her political and legal thought is Hannah Arendt. Arendt read Schmitt, 
agreed with his general critique of the influence of normativism in legal and political 
thought,95 and directly followed his account of the original meaning of nomos. She relies 
heavily on Schmitt’s work in drawing similar conclusions on the true meaning of nomos.  
In On Revolution, Arendt acknowledges the violent nature of the beginning. ‘That 
such a beginning must be intimately connected with violence’, she writes, ‘seems to be 
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vouched for by the legendary beginnings of our history as both biblical and classical antiquity 
report it: Cain slew Abel, and Romulus slew Remus; violence was the beginning and, by the 
same token, no beginning could be made without using violence, without violating’. She also 
notes that ‘whatever brotherhood human beings may be capable of has grown out of 
fratricide, whatever political organization men may have achieved has its origin in crime’.96 
Most significantly, Arendt recognizes that ‘although the word nomos came to assume different 
meanings throughout the centuries of Greek civilization, it never lost its original “spatial 
significance”.’97  
Arendt develops the spatial dimension to nomos in The Human Condition in which, 
closely following Schmitt’s argument about the derivation of nomos,98 she explains that law 
was originally identified with a boundary line and that in the polis ‘it retained its original 
spatial significance’. The law of the city-state, she emphasizes, ‘was neither the content of 
political action’ (ie, decision) and ‘nor was it a catalogue of prohibitions’ (ie, norm). Rather, it 
was ‘quite literally a wall, without which there might have been an agglomeration of houses 
… but not a city, a political community’.99 In a late work, Arendt brings the lines of this 
interpretation of nomos together in a statement that could have been written by Schmitt 
himself: 
Just as the walls of a city … must first be built before there can be a city identifiable 
by its shape and borders, the law determines the character of its inhabitants, setting 
them apart and making them distinguishable from the inhabitants of all other cities. 
The law is the city wall that is instituted … inside of which is created the real political 
realm where many men move about freely. … The law is … something by which the 
polis enters into its continuing life, something it cannot abolish without losing its 
identity, and violation of the law is an act of hubris, the overstepping of a limit 
placed on life itself. The law is not valid outside the polis; its binding power applies 
only to the space that it encloses and delimits. …The crucial point is that law – 
although it defines the space in which men live with one another without using force 
– has something violent about it in terms of both its origins and its nature. … The 
law produces the arena where politics occurs, and contains in itself the violent force 
inherent in all production.100 
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Arendt’s account is of particular interest for two reasons. The first stems from her claim that 
political power is a phenomenon that is not only distinct from but also directly opposed to 
violence.101 Power is generated through the capacity of humans to act in concert. Political 
power begins in action,102 but since it is accepted that the beginning requires the use of 
violence, the relation between power and violence is more complicated than Arendt 
suggests. The second reason concerns law. Arendt makes use of the Roman concept of law: 
law as lex, which is a relational notion. Since lex ‘was not coeval with the foundation of the 
city’ and could not be conceived as ‘pre-political’ (i.e. as constitutive of the political), it 
presupposes the existence of a people.103 This is evidently a different concept to nomos. It 
signifies what Montesquieu conceived as the ‘necessary relations’ by which power was 
sustained: authority is established by ‘augmentation of the foundations’ (or, in Schmitt’s 
word, ‘nourishment’).104 Lex presupposes nomos. But this concept of lex is also more basic 
than the norms of positive law.105 Arendt opens up a more complex and layered 
understanding of law in which positive law presupposes lex, which in turn presupposes 
nomos. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The most basic insight we obtain from a study of Schmitt’s account of the concept of nomos 
is that law is linked to space. The idea of law is tied to the existence of a defined and 
bounded territory that is able to distinguish inside from outside. Without this boundary, 
expressed in the concept of nomos, there can be no domain of the political. In this respect, it 
might be said that nomos is constitutive of the political. The space that is enclosed is not 
merely a geographical notion; as Arendt’s work highlights, it is also a legal and political 
concept which relates ‘not so much, and not primarily, to a piece of land as to the space 
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between individuals in a group whose members are bound to, and at the same time separated 
and protected from, each other by all kinds of relationships, based on a common language, 
religion, a common history, customs and laws’.106 The space of political freedom is created 
only through the formation of these relationships. Arendt explains that wherever freedom 
has existed ‘as a tangible reality’, it has always been spatially limited: ‘if we equate those 
spaces of freedom … with the political realm itself’, she states, ‘we shall be inclined to think 
of them as islands in a sea or as oases in a desert’.107 In a political sense, freedom is both an 
achievement and, from the outset, is ordered.  
Nomos gives expression to that concrete order of political freedom. Schmitt, Arendt 
and Oakeshott all agree that the initial action – the taking – invariably involves an exercise of 
force or violence. They also agree – though they express this is their own distinctive 
terminology – that through ‘customary practices’ (Oakeshott), the emergence of ‘intimate 
connection or relationship’ (Arendt), or the establishment of institutional order (Schmitt), 
force is tamed and ‘moralized’ and power is thereby generated. Law is neither norm nor 
decision as such; it is an arrangement of norms and decisions that emerges within a concrete 
order. 
Schmitt may not have been as explicit as other scholars in acknowledging this power-
generational aspect of state-building, but he was not unaware of this phenomenon. In an 
essay on pluralism and the state published in 1930, he explains that political unity is never in 
reality as monistic as jurists, through simplification, or pluralists, for polemical reasons, 
present it. Even the so-called absolute prince of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
was obliged ‘to respect divine and natural law – that is, to speak sociologically, church and 
family – and to take into account the manifold aspects of traditional institutions and 
established rights’. The political unity of the state ‘has always been a unity of social 
multiplicity’.108 
Elaborating on this theme, Schmitt recognizes that there are many ways of building 
political unity:  
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There is unity from above (through command and power) and unity from below 
(from the substantial homogeneity of the people); unity through enduring association 
and compromise between social groups or through an equilibrium achieved 
somehow by some other means between such groups; unity which comes from 
within and one which rests only on external pressure; a more static and a 
permanently dynamic, functionally integrated unity; finally, there is unity by force and 
unity by consensus.109  
 
In this essay, Schmitt notes that pluralists consider that only a unity achieved by consensus 
can be ethically justified. But this, he explains, is not an unambiguous criterion. Every 
consensus must, by some means or other, be established. Power is generally required to 
produce consensus, including ‘a rational and ethically justified consensus’. But so too can 
consensus produce power, including ‘an irrational and – despite consensus – ethically 
repugnant power’.110 Schmitt here recognizes the complexity, uncertainty and amorality of 
the processes by which institutional order is capable of being ‘nourished’ from its original 
source. 
 The overall significance of Schmitt’s exegesis on nomos is to demonstrate that if the 
originating act of taking/closure is overlooked in legal thought our grasp of the character of 
law in modernity will be skewed. Jurists have avoided this question either by treating the 
foundation as a pure act of representation (as promoted by normativism) or by pre-
supposing some mysterious prior substantive equality of the people (as promoted by 
decisionism). On this fundamental point, Schmitt surely is correct. But his basic insight 
needs to be amended and developed. As Lindahl has noted, ‘an initiation takes on the form 
of an accomplishment because the original self-closure of a community only becomes such 
afterwards, in and through the closures that accomplish it’.111 That is, the act of foundation 
can be understood as such only after the event: the original appropriation – the first meaning 
of nomos as the constitution of ‘the original spatial order, the source of all further concrete 
order and all further law’ (NE 48) – can be identified as foundational only once the second 
and third aspects of nomos (distribution and production) are institutionalized. This gives nomos 
a reflexive dimension, one that is augmented only with the assistance of Arendt’s rendering 
of the relational quality of lex. The authority of the state is established and maintained 
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through a continuous interaction of the modes of ordering that are grasped by nomos, lex and 
positive law.  
   
 
 
